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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since its inception in social psychology, 
Fishbein’s (1 967b) multi-attribute model of 
attitudes has become a major tool in the practice 
of marketing research for the assessment of con- 
sumer perceptions of and preferences for choice 
alternatives in the market place. The popularity 
of the model is easy to comprehend: The model 
seems self-evident and is easy to implement. 
Perhaps due to its large-scale application, 
however, the theoretical roots of the model have 
generally been neglected. 
In this paper, then, we wish to acquaint the 
reader with the theory underlying the Fishbein 
model and to straighten out the relationship 
between both. It will become apparent, however, 
that, at the intersection of theory and model, 
there arise serious problems with the Fishbein 
paradigm. 
We will identify Fishbein’s view on attribute 
((salience)) as a major determinant of these prob- 
lems. In our view, the failure to recognize dep- 
endency of attribute salience on the context in 
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which choice alternatives are perceived is a 
major limitation of the Fishbein paradigm. We 
will extend the original theory so that a 
principled and more complete account of 
attribute salience is provided and formalize the 
extended theory with an adaptation of Tversky’s 
(1 977) contrast model of similarity. In conclud- 
ing th i s  paper, we will briefly discuss the 
strengths and weaknesses of the resulting 
framework for the marketing-research practice. 
2. FOOTNOTES TO FISHBEIN 
After a brief description of Fishbein’s (1967b) 
learning theory of attitudes and the multi-attrib- 
ute model formalizing this theory, we will 
discuss some major problems with the Fishbein 
paradigm in the study of perception and prefer- 
ence. 
2.1. The learning theory of attitudes 
The learning theory of attitudes is based on 
the general principle that attitude formation is a 
resultant of concept formation (Fishbein, 1967b). 
In the learning theory, a concept is defined as 
any discriminable aspect of a person’s world and 
concept formation is defined as the association 
between a common response and a set of stimuli 
and other concepts. An attitude is defined as an 
evaluative response that is learned in conjunction 
with the formation of a concept; i.e., attitude 
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refers only to the evaluative aspect of the total 
meaning response. 
Fishbein (1 967b) reasons that, if concepts are 
formed in the way suggested by the learning 
theory, it follows that a person's responses to the 
concept should be some function of the learning 
process. Immediately after concept formation, 
the concept (now viewed as a stimulus) should 
elicit the set of stimuli and concepts (now 
viewed as responses) that have served to define 
it. The set of responses associated with the con- 
cept are thought of as a belief system or ((habit 
family hierarchy)). The higher a response in the 
hierarchy, the greater the probability that the 
response is associated with the concept, that is, 
the greater the belief strength. Each of these 
associated responses is itself a stimulus that 
elicits a learned evaluative response. There is al- 
ways an evaluative response even though this 
response may be neutral (Fishbein, 1967a, 
1967b). These evaluative responses are summ- 
ative and, the summated evaluative response is 
associated with the concept. When presenting 
the concept as a stimulus, then, it elicits the 
summated evaluative response, in other words, 
the learned attitude. Finally, the higher the 
position of a response to the stimulus concept i n  
the hierarchy (that is, the greater a belief 
strength), the greater is the amount of evaluative 
response that is available for summation. 
Fishbein (1967b) formalized the learning 
theory of attitudes by positing the following 
multi-attribute model: 
n 
i= 1 
Ao = C (Boi * ai). (1) 
In this equation, Ao is the attitude toward 
object o (the evaluation of object o), Boi is the 
probability that object o is associated with 
concept i (the strength of belief that object o is 
associated with concept i), ai is the attitude to- 
ward concept i (the evaluation of concept i) and 
n is the number of concepts in the system 
associated with object 0.' 
Importantly, Boi in equation (1) refers to the 
categorization of the relationship between object 
o and concept i along a probability dimension as 
judged by a person; that is, to the subjective 
probability of the relationship between object 
and concept i. Analogously, Ao and ai refer to 
the categorization of object o and concept i 
along an evaluative dimension as judged by a 
person; that is, to the subjective goodness-bad- 
ness of object o and concept i. 
According to Fishbein (1 967a, 1967b; Fish- 
bein & Ajzen, 1972, 1975; Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1980; Kaplan & Fishbein, 1969), it is only the 
((salient beliefs)) that determine an individual's 
attitude toward an object at a given moment. 
Fishbein suggests that the first five to nine be- 
liefs spontaneously elicited by an individual 
should be regarded as his ((salient beliefs)) about 
the object and should be included into the model. 
Analogously, one could construct a model for the 
entire sample (instead of a unique model for 
each individual in the sample) by including 
those beliefs most frequently elicited across indi- 
viduals (referred to as the ((modal salient be- 
1 iefs))) . 
In the following three subsections, we will 
consider several issues related to the Fishbein 
paradigm. The first issue concerns the appropri- 
ateness of the conceptual definition of attitude 
that is proposed by Fishbein. In relation to this, 
we will discuss an often overlooked aspect of the 
learning theory of attitudes, which is that it is not 
only a theory of stimulus evaluation but also, im- 
plicitly, a theory of stimulus identification. The 
second issue concerns the operationalization of 
the multi-attribute model that formalizes the 
learning theory of attitudes. In relation to this, 
we will argue that Fishbein's suggestion to use 
salient beliefs for model construction actually 
interferes with an appropriate application of the 
model. The third and final issue concerns the 
adequacy of the learning theory of attitudes as a 
general theory of stimulus evaluation. In relation 
to this, we will discuss the implications and 
limitations of the learning theory of attitudes 
with regard to belief salience. 
' Based on the learning theory sketched out 
previously, it is more appropriate to view the multi- 
attribute model as a formula for predicting the 
evaluative aspect of concept o (the representation of 
object 0). 
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2.2. Stimulus identlJication and stimulus eval- 
uation 
According to Fishbein (1967a, 1967b), an 
attitude is the evaluative aspect of the total mea- 
ning response to an object. Thus, it is basically 
suggested that the attitude construct is a unidi- 
mensional construct. The question may be rai- 
sed, however, whether it is appropriate to assume 
that the evaluative aspect of an object is unidi- 
mensional if one adheres to the learning theory 
of attitudes. 
Fishbein (1 967a) acknowledges that the cog- 
nitive aspects of an object may influence the 
evaluative aspect of an object. ((Other types of 
meaning which the object may have for a person 
(...) are excluded from the notion of attitude ex- 
cept insofar as (the other types of meaning) 
may influence the placement which the person 
gives the object on the evaluative dimension.)) 
(p. 258) With ((the other types of meaning)) 
Fishbein refers to the attributes associated with 
an object. The first point to make in response to 
this acknowledgement is that the attributes asso- 
ciated with the object not only may have an 
influence on the evaluation of the object but that, 
following the learning theory and its formali- 
zation by the multi-attribute model in equation 
(l), these attributes necessarily have an influence 
on object evaluation. The second point to make 
is that the attitude toward the object cannot be 
accounted for without prior specification of 
exactly those attributes that are characteristic of 
the object. Within the Fishbein perspective, there 
is no object meaning (whether evaluative or 
not) without ((the other types of meaning)). 
Another way to make the second point is to 
acknowledge that the Fishbein theory is not only 
a theory of object evaluation but also, implicitly, 
a theory of object identification. One step in 
Fishbein’s (1 967b) reasoning is that, immedi- 
ately after concept formation, the concept (now 
viewed as a stimulus) should elicit the set of 
stimuli and concepts (now viewed as responses) 
that have served to define it. If this arbitrary step 
is not taken, however, it becomes more apparent 
that object evaluation necessarily includes the 
object’s attributes as meaning elements. Consi- 
der the following argument. 
Suppose one presents a person with attributes 
which one a priori assumes to be those character- 
istic of some specific object or some specific set 
of objects. The task of the person is to indicate 
the probability that any object can be characte- 
rized by the attributes (object identification) and 
to indicate the characteristicness of the attributes 
vis-i-vis every object that is identified (the 
associative strength between attributes and 
object). The Fishbein theory predicts that the 
probability of object identification is an 
increasing function of the associative strengths 
between attributes and object. Now suppose, 
instead, that one presents the person with the 
same set of attributes and, before proceeding, let 
the person indicate the evaluation of the various 
attributes. Then the task of the person is to indi- 
cate the evaluation of each object that can be 
characterized by the attributes (object evalu- 
ation) and to indicate the characteristicness of 
the attributes vis-i-vis every object that is 
identified (the associative strength between 
attributes and object). The Fishbein theory 
predicts that object evaluation is an increasing 
function of the multiplicative combination of 
attribute evaluations and associative strengths 
between attributes and object. The point is that, 
at a conceptual level, the attitude toward the 
object is a composite response: It is constituted 
of both an identification response and an eval- 
uation response. The identification response is a 
meaning response to the object’s attributes as 
meaning elements. 
The implication of the previous argument is 
that only the operational definition of the attitude 
toward an object should be regarded as unidi- 
mensional (the categorization of the object along 
a good-bad dimension). By the same token, the 
operational definition of object identification 
should be regarded as unidimensional (the cate- 
gorization of the object along a probability di- 
mension). 
2.3. Stimulus dimensions and stimulus attrib- 
utes 
Consider the probability distribution in an 
individual’s representation of brand X on four 
binary dimensions as displayed in Figure 1 .  
In the individual’s representation of brand X, 
each dimension (D) has two categories or attri- 
butes (in abstract denoted by 1 and 0) and these 
attributes provide mutually exclusive and colle- 
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ctively exhaustive characterizations of the branc,. 
Suppose we are dealing with the representation 
of some car brand, characterized by the follow- 
ing attributes: Small and large size ( D I ) ,  
catalyser and no catalyser (D2), five and four 
doors (D3) and two side mirrors and one side 
mirror (D4). Consistent with the learning theory 
of attitudes, there is a probability between 0 and 
1 that an attribute is associated with the brand 
and there is a probability of 1 that either the one 
or the other attribute on a dimension is associ- 
ated with the brand. Thus, for example, the 
belief hierarchy represents the individual’s belief 
that cars of brand X are small with 8056 
probability and large with 20% probability. 
FIGURE 1 
Brand X 
D1 D2 D3 D4 
1 0.80 0.60 1 .oo 0.60 
0 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.40 
Even though it seems safe to assume that the 
strength of belief involving one attribute (BXI) 
is inversely related to the strength of belief in-  
volving the other attribute on a dimension 
(BXO), the assumption of probabilistic symmetry 
(that is, BXl=l-BXO) may be too strong (Fish- 
bein & Ajzen, 1975). The learning theory of atti- 
tudes, however, does not account for systematic 
departures from probabilistic symmetry. In what 
follows, then, we will simply assume that the 
assumption is correct. 
The purpose of this subsection is to demon- 
strate that Fishbein’s suggestion to include only 
((salient beliefs)) about the object into the multi- 
attribute model of attitudes (see equation [ l ] )  
may, in general, lead to inaccurate prediction of 
the attitude toward the object. We discuss model 
construction based on individual salient belief‘s 
and model construction based on modal salient 
beliefs in succession. 
2.3.1. Inclusion of individual salient beliefs 
When constructing a model unique for each 
individual, Ajzen & Fishbein (1 980) sugges.t 
the use of bipolar scales for measuring evalu- 
ative aspects and unipolar scales for measuring 
belief strengths.2 Thus, the evaluation of the 
object (Ao) and the evaluation of the attributes 
(ai) may be measured on seven-point scales ran- 
ging from -3 (((extremely unattractive))) to +3 
(((extremely attractive))); the belief strengths 
may be measured on continuous scales ranging 
from 0% to 100% likelihood that the attributes 
are associated with the object or, alternatively, 
on four-point scales ranging from 0 (((not at all 
likely))) to +3 (((extremely likely))). 
Prior to scale construction, however, the ind- 
ividual elicits his beliefs about the object. Given 
the belief hierarchy in the above example, the 
individual would certainly not elicit the belief 
that cars of brand X ((have four doors)) and it 
would be extremely unlikely that he would elicit 
the belief that cars of brand X ((have a large si- 
ze)). In contrast, the belief that cars of brand X 
((have five doors)) and the belief that cars of 
brand X ((have a small size)) would most prob- 
ably be among the salient beliefs and would, 
therefore, be included into the model. 
What are the implications of this measure- 
ment procedure for the prediction of the indiv- 
idual’s attitude toward brand X? We concentrate 
on the size dimension. If the individual indicates 
a +2 evaluation of ((small size)) cars and an 
80% probability that cars of brand X are of 
crsmall size)), this increases the predicted evalu- 
ation of brand X by (0.80 * (+2)) = 1.60 units. 
But what about the individual’s belief that cars 
of brand X are of ((large size)) with a 20% prob- 
ability? Since this belief is not among the salient 
ones, it is not included into the model. But if the 
individual has a nonneutral attitude toward 
((large size)) cars, his nonsalient belief should 
nonetheless have an effect on the predicted 
evaluation of brand X. Assuming that the indiv- 
idual’s evaluation ((large size)) cars is the polar 
opposite of his evaluation of ((small size)) cars 
(that is, a0 = -al), the predicted evaluation of 
brand X should decrease by 0.40 units. This de- 
crement in brand evaluation fails to manifest 
’ See Kaplan & Fishbein (1969), however, for 
measuring belief strenghs on bipolar scales while 
constructing models based on individual salient 
beliefs. 
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itself, however, if we follow Fishbein’s guideline 
to include the salient belief only. 
2.3 .2 .  Inclusion of modal salient beliefs 
When constructing a model for an entire sam- 
ple of individuals, Ajzen & Fishbein (1980) 
suggest the use of bipolar scales for measuring 
evaluative aspects and belief strengths. Most 
typically, belief strengths are measured on 
seven-point scales ranging from -3 (((extremely 
unlikely))) to +3 (((extremely likely))). The ratio- 
nale for measuring belief strengths on bipolar 
scales is that an individual may actually disbelief 
a statement that he has not elicited himself. As 
we will see in the following, however, the meas- 
urement of belief strengths on bipolar scales rai- 
ses more problems than it solves. 
In an earlier work, Fishbein & Ajzen (1975) 
point out that responses toward the negative 
pole of bipolar probability scale should not be 
regarded as dissociations (negative associations), 
since the learning theory of attitudes permits on- 
ly positive associations. If, in response to the be- 
lief statement N O  is j)), an individual chooses a 
position toward the negative pole of the prob- 
ability scale, this means for the learning theorist 
that the individual rather believes that ((0 is (not 
j))). Viewed in this way, the bipolar scale is not 
truly a bipolar scale: It is a composite of two 
unipolar scales - one for attribute j and one for 
attribute (not j). 
One problem with this solution, as also recog- 
nized by Fishbein & Ajzen, is that it works if 
and only if the evaluations of j and (not j)  are 
equally polarized in opposite direction (that is, 
a1 = - aO). However, neither the learning theory 
of attitudes nor common sense dictates this eval- 
uative symmetry. The individual in our example 
may evaluate cars with ((fours doors)) as quite 
attractive (as indicated by +2 on the scale) be- 
cause such cars are easy to enter for passengers, 
whereas he may evaluate cars with ((five doors)) 
as extremely attractive (as indicated by +3 on the 
scale) because such cars combine ease of entry 
with ease of loading and unloading goods. 
Evaluative asymmetry may lead to dram- 
atically inaccurate predictions when using 
bipolar probability scales. Given the strengths of 
belief that brand X has either attribute, we 
should arrive at the prediction that the indiv- 
idual’s evaluation of brand X increases by (0 * 
(+2))  + ( (+3)  * (+3)) = 9 units. That is, the 
attribute of which he believes that it is ((not at all 
likely)) to be associated with brand X adds 
nothing at all to the predicted evaluation and the 
attribute of  which he believes that it is 
((extremely likely)) to be associated with the 
brand adds 9 units to the predicted evaluation. 
When using bipolar scales, however, we obtain 
((-3) * (+2)) = -6. Thus, we arrive at the pred- 
iction that the individual’s evaluation of brand X 
decreases by 6 units rather than that it increases 
by 9 units. 
Another problem with the use of bipolar prob- 
ability scales, as also recognized by Fishbein & 
Ajzen, is that these scales provide relative rather 
than absolute measures of belief strengths. That 
is, a bipolar probability scale does not provide an 
unambiguous measure of either the belief that ((0 
is j)) or the belief that ((0 is (not j))); rather, a res- 
ponse on a bipolar probability scale is best view- 
ed as a function of the strength of the indiv- 
idual’s two unipolar beliefs. When confronted 
with the statement that cars of brand X ((have a 
small size)), the individual in our example may 
comprise his belief that it is quite certain that 
cars of brand X will ((have a small size)) with his 
belief that it is slightly certain that cars of brand 
X will ((have a large size)) by responding on the 
bipolar scale that it is only slightly certain that 
cars of brand X will ((have a small size)). This 
ambiguity in measurement may further interfere 
with an accurate prediction of the individual’s 
attitude toward brand X: A compromise strength 
of belief is paired with the evaluation of only 
one of the two attributes believed to be associ- 
ated with the brand. 
We can take the present argument against the 
use of bipolar probability scales one step further 
by raising the question: When will an individual 
choose the neutral position on such a scale? 
Assuming, as we have been doing throughout 
our discussion, that the object is represented 
along binary dimensions, the most reasonable 
answer seems to be: When the individual consid- 
ers it equally probable that the object is asso- 
ciated with either the one or the other attribute 
on a dimension. But this runs counter to the lear- 
ning theoretical view on the bipolar probability 
scale, which is that it is a composite of two uni- 
polar scales. According to this view, the neutral 
- 
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position on the scale indicates that the individual 
believes that neither the one nor the other attrib- 
ute is associated with the object. The conclusion 
is again that the measurement procedure maj 
interfere with an accurate prediction of the. 
individual’s attitude toward brand X: Regardless 
of how attractive or unattractive the attributes 
are to the individual, the prediction of his 
attitude toward brand X remains unaffected. 
A final problem with the use of bipolar proba. 
bility scales is that this measurement procedure 
may confound attribute possession with prob- 
ability of attribute possession whenever the 
representation of an object along a dimension is 
differentiated into more than two categories or 
attributes; that is, the procedure may confouncl 
what the individual believes with how strongly 
the individual believes what he does (see also 
Ahtola, 1975). Suppose that the individual’:; 
representation of brand X along the number of 
doors dimension is differentiated into four 
categories: Cars of brand X may have two, three, 
four or five doors. When confronted with tht: 
statement that cars of brand X ((have four 
doors)), there are many response strategies ht: 
could adopt. We mention only two relatively 
simple ones. One strategy is to reserve the ((four 
doors)) category for the positive end of the scale, 
to join the remaining categories on the negative 
end and to provide a probability rating as if thr: 
dimension had only two categories. Another 
strategy is to select the category that is most 
strongly associated with brand X and to assign it 
to a location on the scale that best indicates the 
relative number of doors. It is in such case that 
probability of  attribute possession gets 
confounded with attribute possession. In either 
case, however, it seems doubtful whether one 
will arrive at an accurate prediction of thl: 
attitude toward brand X. 
All problems discussed in this subsection 
basically arise from Fishbein’s suggestion to 
use only salient beliefs for model construction. It 
seems safe to conclude, then, that his suggestion 
actually interferes with an appropriate applic- 
ation of the model. Especially the use of modal 
salient beliefs together with bipolar probability 
scales seems problematic. Given that Fishbein & 
Ajzen (1975) have recognized at least some of 
the problems discussed here, it may seem surp- 
rising that Ajzen & Fishbein (1980) adhere to 
this research strategy. But, in fact, it is hard to 
say what position these authors take on this 
issue. On the one hand, they contend that the 
most accurate predictions are likely to result 
when estimates of belief strength and evaluation 
for multiple categories on dimensions are 
obtained (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p. 84). On the 
other hand, they doubt whether a consideration 
of multiple categories would greatly increase the 
predictive power of the attitude model (Fishbein 
& Ajzen, 1975, p. 103). A direct test of both 
models, reported by Ahtola (1 975) and to be dis- 
cussed in the following section, clearly favored a 
model with multiple categories on dimensions to 
one without. 
2.4. Attribute salience and its determinants 
According to Fishbein (1 967b), it is only the 
((salient)) beliefs that determine an individual’s 
attitude toward an object at a given moment. As 
it follows from the learning theory, one forms 
beliefs about an object by associating it with 
various attributes; the set of attributes associated 
with the object is thought of as a belief system or 
((habit family hierarchy)). The higher an attribute 
in the hierarchy, the greater the probability that it 
is associated with the object, that is, the greater 
the belief strength. Theoretically, the most sal- 
ient beliefs are those uppermost in an individ- 
ual’s hierarchy. Operationally, Fishbein (1 967b) 
assumes that the first five to nine beliefs spont- 
aneously elicited by an individual are his salient 
beliefs about the object. 
But the ((magical number seven, plus or minus 
two)) may not be the final word on the identi- 
fication of salient beliefs. Fishbein & Ajzen 
(1975) are very clear on this point. ((It is possible 
(...) that only the first two or three beliefs are 
salient for a given individual and that additional 
beliefs elicited beyond this point are not primary 
determinants of his attitude (i.e., are not salient). 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine the 
point at which a person starts eliciting nonsalient 
beliefs. Recommending the use of the first five 
to nine beliefs is therefore merely a rule of 
thumb.)) (p. 218)’ But if salient beliefs are to be 
’ See also Ajzen & Fishbein (1980, p. 64). 
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FIGURE 2 
Brand X 
D1 D2 D3 D4 
1 0.80 0.60 1.00 0.60 
0 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.40 
Brand Y 
D1 D2 D3 D4 
1 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.25 
0 0.75 0.50 0.75 0.75 
identified with a rule of thumb, this means that 
we do not have substantive theory yet that spe- 
cifies for us what beliefs determine an indivi- 
dual’s attitude toward an object. 
If Fishbein’s learning theory of attitudes were 
an adequate theory of stimulus evaluation, there 
should be a one-to-one correspondence between 
the position of an attribute in the hierarchy and 
the probability that it is associated with a con- 
cept (Hackman & Anderson, 1968). It follows 
that there should be a continuous scale of sa- 
lience; attributes with a higher position in the 
hierarchy (as operationalized, for example, by 
the ordinal position in a free elicitation task) and 
with a greater probability of being associated 
with a concept (as operationalized, for example, 
by a numerical belief strength in a probability 
rating task) should be thought of as more salient 
than attributes with a lower position in the hier- 
archy and with a smaller probability of being 
associated with the concept. 
Fishbein (1 967b), however, treats salience in 
an all-or-none way; attributes above some 
arbitrary threshold are in the hierarchy (salient) 
and those below the threshold are not in the 
hierarchy (nonsalient). The problem here is that 
the learning theory does not provide any ration- 
ale for treating salience in a discontinuous way 
and, therefore, does not provide a nonarbitrary 
threshold. Furthermore, Kaplan & Fishbein 
(1969) suggest that an attribute may have a 
great probability of being associated with a con- 
cept even though it is below the threshold and, 
therefore, nonsalient. The problem here is, of 
I 
I 
1 
i 
I 
course, that any noncorrespondence between 
position in the hierarchy and probability of 
association cannot be accounted for by the learn- 
ing theory. The basic question that arises is: 
What is salience if not another word for belief 
strength? 
According to Ortony, Vondruska, FOSS & 
Jones (1 9 8 9 ,  salient attributes are simply those 
that are readily accessible and attribute salience 
may be determined by a variety of factors. AC- 
ceptance of this proposal and a specification of 
factors determining attribute salience may 
suggest several shortcomings of the learning 
theory of attitudes as a general theory of stim- 
ulus evaluation. In what follows, we will discuss 
several determinants of salience. 
Suppose that our exemplary individual act- 
ually has two car brands in his ((evoked set)) 
(Howard & Sheth, 1966) and that his represen- 
tation of these brands can be schematized as in 
Figure 2. 
Brand X is not anymore the only object in the 
psychological domain of car brands: Brand Y is 
an alternative. A context of alternatives to an 
object in some domain we call the effective con- 
text of that object. Thus, brand Y is the effective 
context of brand X and vice versa. 
The attributes ((catalyser)) (category 1 on D2) 
and ((two side mirrors)) (category 1 on D4) have 
an equal strength of association with brand X; in 
other words, the prominence of these attributes 
in the representation of brand X is of equal 
magnitude. In a probability rating task, the indiv- 
idual is likely to indicate an equal strength of 
association with brand X for these attributes. 
Fishbein should be puzzled, however, if the 
individual would make a much earlier mention 
of ((two side mirrors)) in a free elicitation task 
(for example, as the third attribute) than of wa-  
talysern (for example, as the sixth attribute). 
This may be less puzzling if we take the promi- 
nence of these attributes in the representation of 
brand Y into account. Consider the following 
excerpt: 
D2 D4 
X Y  X Y 
1 0.60 0.50 1 0.60 0.25 
0 0.40 0.50 0 0.40 0.75 
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It becomes apparent that the side mirror di- 
mension (D4) is more relevant in discriminating 
brand X from brand Y than the catalyser dimen- 
sion (D2). We refer to the relevance in effective 
context as the diagnosticity of a dimension (cf. 
Tversky, 1977). In a free elicitation task, the diff- 
erential diagnosticity of both dimensions should 
increase the salience of the attribute ((two side 
mirrors)) relative to the salience of the attribute 
((catalyser)) and this accounts for the fact that the 
individual mentions the former attribute much 
earlier than the latter one. 
In general, then, an attribute may be very 
prominent in the representation of a brand and 
potentially salient; but if it is also very prom- 
inent in the representation of other brands and 
the attribute thus becomes rather nondiagnostic, 
there is possibly a decrement in the salience of 
that attribute (cf. Myers & Alpert, 1977). 
In a similar vein, the above logic can accounr. 
for the fact that the individual indicates an equal 
strength of association with brand Y for the 
attribute ((four doors)) (category 0 on D3) and the 
attribute ((large size)) (category 0 on D1) while 
eliciting the former attribute much earlier thari 
the latter one. Even though these attributes are 
equally prominent in the representation of the 
brands, the number of doors dimension (D3) is 
more diagnostic than the size dimension (Dl )  
This becomes apparent from the following 
excerpt: 
D1 D3 
X Y  X Y 
1 0.80 0.25 1 1.00 0.25 
0 0.20 0.75 0 0.00 0.75 
But the diagnosticity principle may not reach 
far enough in accounting for differential salience 
of attributes. During attribute elicitation, the i n  
dividual may also be influenced by some inter-. 
nally generated context like (<suitability for city 
traffic)): The attributes that are most characte- 
ristic of brand X (small size, catalyser, five: 
doors and two side mirrors) make a car more sub 
table for city traffic than those that are characte-, 
ristic of brand Y (large size, four doors and one: 
side m i r r ~ r ) . ~  Such context outside the effective 
domain, whether generated internally or pre- 
sented externally, we call general context. Now 
suppose that the individual’s representation of a 
car that is suitable for city traffic is as follows: 
Hypothetical car 
D1 D2 D3 D4 
1 1.00 0.50 0.60 0.75 
0 0.00 0.50 0.40 0.25 
We see that the probability distribution on the 
size dimension (DI)  departs much more from a 
chance level distribution than the probability 
distribution on the number of doors dimension 
(D3). In this sense, D1 has a much greater 
relevance in the general context than D3. We 
refer to the relevance in general context as the 
selectivity of a dimension (cf. Smith, Osherson, 
Rips & Kean, 1988). 
The diagnosticity principle and the selectivity 
principle may influence the relative salience of 
attributes in opposite directions. In our example, 
diagnosticity boosts the salience of ((four doors)) 
relative to the salience of ((large size)) and se- 
lectivity does the opposite. This becomes appar- 
ent from the following excerpt: 
D1 
HC X Y 
1 1 .oo 0.80 0.25 
0 0.00 0.20 0.75 
D3 
HC 
1 0.60 1 .oo 0.25 
0 0.40 0.00 0.75 
More specifically, the excerpt suggests that, in 
the present case, the influence of the selectivity 
Along the catalyser dimension, none of the 
attributes is most characteristic of brand Y .  
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principle is likely to overcome the influence of 
the diagnosticity principle and that, judged from 
free elicitation data, the salience of ((large size)) 
is considerably greater than the salience of ((four 
doors)). 
Clearly, the overall conclusion may be that, to 
the extent that attribute salience is determined by 
factors other than feature prominence, the 
learning theory of attitudes is inadequate. The 
multi-attribute perspective on stimulus evalu- 
ation may profit from a joint consideration of the 
prominence of attributes, the relevance of dim- 
ensions in effective context (diagnositicity) and 
the relevance of dimensions in general context 
(selectivity) in determining what attributes will 
become salient and, in effect, what meaning the 
stimulus will have to the individual. 
The purpose of the preceding discussion was 
to point out three basic difficulties with the 
Fishbein paradigm in the study of perception and 
preference. Our discussion has supplied us with 
sufficient ingredients to suggest some fundam- 
ental improvements of the multi-attribute persp- 
modifications of the Fishbein model that have 
already been put forward by other investigators. 
None of the existing modifications, however, 
will offer a solution to all difficulties pointed out 
previously. 
I ective. In the following section, we will discuss 
3. MODIFICATIONS OF THE FISHBEIN MODEL 
3.1. ModiJication I :  The Ahtola model 
Ahtola (1975) has modified the Fishbein 
model by incorporating multiple attributes on 
stimulus dimensions. Thus, the multi-attribute 
model in equation (1) is transformed into the 
following model: 
n ni 
A o =  C 2 (Boij * aij), 
i=l j=1 
where Ao is the evaluation of object 0, Boij is 
the probability that object o is associated with 
attribute ij (the strength of belief that object o is 
associated with the jth category on dimension i), 
aij is the evaluation of attribute ij (the jth catego- 
ry on dimension i), n is the number of dimen- 
sions and ni is the number of categories (attrib- 
utes) on dimension i. 
The Ahtola model is the straightforward sol- 
ution to all difficulties with the Fishbein model 
pointed out in 2.3., in that it identifies a set of 
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive 
(and, therefore, not necessarily salient) attributes 
on stimulus dimensions. As already noted, Fish- 
bein & Ajzen (1975) doubt whether such modif- 
ication would greatly increase the predictive 
power of the attitude model. The results obtained 
by Ahtola ( 1  975) clearly suggest otherwise: The 
Ahtola model outperformed the Fishbein model 
with an average fit of 0.714 to 0.332. 
Apart from this considerable improvement, 
the Ahtola model inherits all limitations of the 
Fishbein model with regard to the determination 
of attribute salience (see 2.4.). Only prominence 
is specified as a determinant of salience in the 
prediction of attitudes; additional factors, such as 
diagnosticity and selectivity, are not incorporated 
into the model. Both the Fishbein model and the 
Ahtola model, then, are adequate to the extent 
that stimulus evaluation can be considered 
context-independent. 
3.2. Mod$cation 2: The Wyer model 
Wyer (1 970) advances a model that incorp- 
orates multiple attributes on stimulus dimensions 
and a component representing the relevance of 
the dimensions to the evaluation of the stimulus: 
n ni 
AO = E 2 (Roi * Boij * aij), 
i=l j=1 
where Ao is the evaluation of object 0, Roi is 
the relevance of dimension i to the evaluation of 
object 0, Boij is the probability that object o is 
associated with attribute ij, aij is the evaluation 
of attribute ij, n is the number of dimensions and 
ni is the number of attributes on dimension i. 
What Wyer means by ((relevance to the eval- 
uation of the object)) can be clarified with his 
suggestion that attributes on a dimension of 
((morality)) may be more relevant to the evalu- 
ation of a priest than to the evaluation of a win- 
dow-cleaner. That is, whether ((moral)) or ctim- 
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moral)) is specified as an attribute has a greater 
effect on the evaluation of a priest than on the 
evaluation of a window-cleaner. This differential 
relevance to the evaluation of an object is repres- 
ented by the Roi component. 
When may the object-specific relevance 
component add to the predictive power of the 
multi-attribute model? A possibility is that the 
usefulness of such component goes up when the 
dimensional commonality among the objects in 
the effective domain goes down. That is, the rel- 
evance component may be useful to the extent 
that the objects in the effective domain cannot be 
identified along the same dimensions. Viewed in 
this way, the Roi component regulates the entry 
of dimensions to the model. In case of multiplt: 
objects, Fishbein would select out dimension:; 
for each object separately according to an all-or- 
none criterion and prior to model testing. With 
the Wyer model it is possible to select out di- 
mensions according to a continuous criterion and 
during model testing. 
Apart from enhancing the flexibility of the 
model in the prediction of attitudes toward mult- 
iple objects, however, the Wyer model exhibit:; 
the same limitations with regard to the determ- 
ination of attribute salience as the Ahtola model. 
3.3 .  Modification 3: The Hackman & Ander- 
son model 
According to Hackman & Anderson (1968), 
the evaluation of an object may not be stable 
across contexts. In order to obtain flexibiliti 
across contexts, these investigators suggest to 
add a component to the Fishbein formula repre- 
senting the relevance of a belief to an external 
criterion. Here, belief relevance is defined as the 
((degree to which a particular belief is important 
to a subject in evaluating an attitude object 
when a specijic criterion is used)) (p. 56). Thus, 
the multi-attribute model in equation (1) is 
transformed into the following model: 
n 
Aco = C 
i= 1 
(Rci * Boi * ai), 
where Aco is the evaluation of object o with 
regard to a specific criterion c, Rci is the rel- 
evance of attribute i to the specific criterion c ,  
Boi is the probability that object o is associated 
with attribute i ,  ai is the evaluation of attribute i 
and n is the number of attributes associated 
with object 0. 
A strength of the Hackman & Anderson mod- 
el is that it incorporates a component for, what 
we would call, belief relevance in general 
context or selectivity of beliefs. It is recognized 
that the attributes associated with an object may 
be of differential relevance to some specific 
criterion and that the evaluation of the object 
with regard to that criterion may be generated 
accordingly. 
In spite of this theoretical improvement, our 
perspective suggests three limitations of the 
Hackman & Anderson model. Two of these lim- 
itations are directly inherited from the Fishbein 
paradigm. The first limitation is that the model 
fails to consider multiple categories on dimen- 
sions. The second limitation is that, although the 
model deals with belief selectivity (relevance in 
general context), it fails to consider belief diag- 
nosticity (relevance in effective context). One 
may circumvent these limitations rightaway by 
advancing the following model: 
n ni 
Aco = C C (Ri * Boij * aij), (2) 
i=l j=1 
where Aco is the evaluation of object o with 
regard to general context c, Ri is the relevance of 
dimension i, Boij is the probability that object o 
is associated with attribute ij, aij is the evalu- 
ation of attribute ij, n is the number of dimens- 
ions and ni is the number of attributes on dim- 
ension i .  The relevance component Ri is assum- 
ed to incorporate an aspect of relevance in effec- 
tive context (a diagnosticity weight Di attached 
to dimension i) and an aspect of relevance in 
general context (a selectivity weight Si attached 
to dimension i), perhaps to be specified accor- 
ding to the formula Ri = (Di * Si). 
This proposal, however, would leave the third, 
and final, limitation of the Hackman & Anderson 
model untouched. This limitation follows di- 
rectly from the recognition that object evaluation 
implies object identification if one assumes that 
the learning theory is correct (see 2.2.): Accord- 
ing to the learning theory of attitudes, no attitude 
toward an object can be formed without identi- 
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fying the object on the basis of the attribute 
characteristic of that object. This applies, how- 
ever, when the criterion is the evaluation of the 
object (Ao); when accounting for a meaning 
response such as the evaluation of the object 
with regard to some general context (Aco), the 
model in equation (2) is overly simplistic. The 
model only incorporates identification of the 
object, whereas it should incorporate (1) ident- 
ification of the object, (2) identification of the 
general context and (3) an assessment of the 
similarity between object and general context. 
Without simultaneously including these aspects 
of context-bound stimulus evaluation into the 
model, a straightforward extension of the learn- 
ing theory to the study of such meaning respo- 
nses fails. In the following section, then, we will 
discuss a model that may be more appropriate 
for dealing with context-bound stimulus evalu- 
ation. 
4. THE CONTRAST MODEL OF STIMULUS 
EVALUATION 
Tversky’s (1977) contrast model of stimulus 
similarity accounts for the psychological 
similarity of two stimuli by assuming an attrib- 
ute-matching process. Similarity is expressed 
as a contrast between those attributes common to 
both stimuli, on the one hand, and those attrib- 
utes distinctive of either one of the stimuli, on 
the other hand. By assuming that common attrib- 
utes increase and distinctive attributes decrease 
the psychological similarity between two stimuli, 
the model accounts for observations like (tan 
apple is more similar to a watermelon than to an 
olive)). 
Tversky’s contrast model may account for 
context-bound stimulus evaluation given that 
two major modifications have been carried 
through. First, the model should include attrib- 
utes and attribute evaluations. Second, the model 
should set a contrast between those attributes 
distinctive of the evaluated stimulus and those 
attributes common to the evaluated stimulus and 
contextual stimulus, on the one hand, and those 
attributes distinctive of the contextual stimulus, 
on the other hand. 
Let us examine the resulting model with an 
example. Suppose that mister K. evaluates per- 
sons only in terms of the type of body that they 
have and that he distinguishes three types of 
body: Picnic, athletic and leptosomic. Suppose 
also that mister K. finds an athletic body very 
attractive (a=+3) but picnic and leptosomic 
bodies very unattractive (a=-3). If mister K. 
would encounter a single person on the street, he 
would probably evaluate that person in close 
correspondence with his evaluation of the 
person’s body type; i.e., an athletic person would 
receive an evaluation of +3, whereas a picnic or 
leptosomic person would receive an evaluation 
But what if mister K. would encounter two 
persons on the street? According to the pre- 
viously proposed model of context-bound stim- 
ulus evaluation, mister K.’s evaluation of one 
person (the ((focal person))) in the context of the 
other person (the (contextual person))) is a func- 
tion of the evaluated attributes distinctive of the 
focal person plus the evaluated attributes com- 
mon to the focal person and the contextual per- 
son minus the evaluated attributes distinctive of 
the contextual person. If mister K. evaluates a 
picnic or leptosomic person in the context of an 
athletic person, then, the focal person will 
receive an evaluation of -3+O-(+3)=-6. Conv- 
ersely, if mister K. evaluates an athletic person in 
the context of a picnic or leptosomic person, the 
focal person will receive an evaluation of +3+0- 
(-3)=+6. Relative to the context-free evaluations, 
then, the evaluations become more polarized: 
something bad makes something good look even 
better by comparison, while something good 
makes something bad look even worse. 
What if mister K. would encounter a picnic 
and a leptosomic person? The focal person, 
whether the picnic or the leptosomic one, would 
receive an evaluation of -3+O-(-3)=0. Relative to 
the context-free evaluations, then, the evalua- 
tions would become more compromised two 
different bad things make each other look better 
by comparison. If, however, mister K. would 
encounter two persons with the same body type, 
his evaluation of either person would be the 
same as the context-free evaluation: no contrast, 
no effect. 
Smith et al. (1988) have adapted the contrast 
model in order to account for typicality rela- 
tionships between stimuli. Typicality relation- 
ships can be seen as similarity relationships 
Of -3. 
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n ni 
Ri * ( C aij * [(Boij . Bcij) + min (Bcij, Boij) - (Bcij . Boij)]) 
i= 1 j= l  
Aco = 1 
between two stimuli represented at different lev- 
els of abstraction; a typicality relationship is a 
similarity relationship between the represent- 
ation of an instance of a concept and the represe- 
ntation of the concept. Thus, an apple is more or 
less ((similar)) to a watermelon and a more or 
less ((typical)) example of fruit. In the formula- 
tion proposed by Smith et al., the contrast model 
accounts for the typicality of an instance with 
regard to its concept by assuming a process in 
which frequency distributions on dimensions 
are matched with one another. The greater the 
commonality and the smaller the distinctiveness 
in frequency distributions when matching the 
representation of the instance and the represent- 
ation of the concept, the more typical is the ins- 
tance with regard to its concept. By assuming 
this, the model accounts for observations like 
(can apple is a more typical example of fruit than 
is a watermelon.)). 
We may adapt Smith et al.’s version of the 
contrast model in order to account for evaluative 
responses to objects in some psychological 
domain (effective context) with regard to some 
general context.5 First, we replace the frequency 
distributions by probability distributions. Sec- 
ond, we replace the contrast rule for stimulus 
similarity/typicality by the previously examined 
contrast rule for stimulus evaluation. Thus, we 
propose the model of context-bound stimulus 
evaluation that is specified at the top of this 
page.h 
In our model, Aco is the evaluation of object 
o with regard to general context c, Ri is the 
relevance of dimension i (specified as in equa- 
tion [ 2 ] ) ,  aij is the evaluation of attribute ij, Bcij 
Here, as elsewhere in this paper (see 2.4.), general 
context is conceived of as some hypothetical object 
corresponding to the psychological domain. 
‘ For expository simplicity, we have omitted free 
parameters for the relative weight of  the three 
probability distributions in setting up the contrast (cf. 
Tversky, 1977; Smith et al., 1988). 
is the probability that general context c is assoc- 
iated with attribute ij, Boij is the probability that 
object o is associated with attribute ij, n is the 
number of dimensions and ni is the number of 
attributes on dimension i. Furthermore, (Boij . 
Bcij) is the associative strength that is distinctive 
of 0, min (Bcij, Boij) is the associative strength 
that is common to c and 0, and (Bcij . Boij) is the 
associative strength that is distinctive of c. 
To clarify the notion of commonality and dis- 
tinctiveness in probability distributions, suppose 
that dimension i is a binary dimension: There is 
a probability of 0.60 that attribute i l  is asso- 
ciated with object o (Boil=0.60) and a prob- 
ability of 0.80 that this attribute is associated 
with the general context c (Bci 1 =0.80); By prob- 
abilistic symmetry, there is a probability of 0.40 
that attribute i0 is associated with object o (BoiO 
= 0.40) and a probability of 0.20 that this attrib- 
ute is associated with the general context c (BciO 
= 0.20). Given these values, (Boij . Bcij) is 
0.00 for attribute i l  and 0.20 for attribute i0; min 
(Bcij, Boij) is 0.60 for attribute i l  and 0.20 for 
attribute i0; and (Bcij . Boij) is 0.20 for attribute 
il and 0.00 for attribute i0. 
Faia Correia (1 992) and Scholten (1 993) pre- 
sent an empirical comparison of Fishbein’s 
learning theory of attitudes and the extended 
framework developed in this paper. Though 
obtained with a contrast rule theoretically 
inferior to the one proposed here, the results 
clearly favor the extended framework over 
Fishbein’s learning theory as an account of 
context-bound stimulus evaluation. 
5. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
The academic interest in the effects of context 
on consumer perception, preference and choice 
is growing (e.g., Chakravarti & Lynch, 1983; 
Huber, Payne & Puto, 1982; Huber & Puto, 
1983; Mishra, Umesh & Stem, 1993; Simonson 
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& Tversky, 1992; Tversky & Simonson, 1993). 
In this paper, we have expanded the Fishbein 
model, a popular tool for the assessment of con- 
sumer perceptions and preferences in marketing- 
research practice, so as to incorporate context 
dependency. Although this seems a major impro- 
vement to us, some preliminary reservations are 
in place. 
To begin with, our theoretical analysis has 
been based on the assumption that the general 
context can be characterized along the same di- 
mensions as the objects in the effective context. 
We have discussed general context in terms of a 
cchypothetical object)) added to an effective con- 
text of ((real objects)). This has been convenient 
but equally limited in scope. Consider, for exam- 
ple, the possibility of adding a general context 
like ((safari)) to an effective context of cigarette 
brands. A dimension along which this general 
context might differentiate the various brands in 
the effective context (for example, a ((purity)) di- 
mension) might not have been included in the 
representation of any of the brands before expo- 
sure to the ((safari)) context. This amounts to the 
well-known feature addition problem (e.g., 
Hampton, 1987; Smith & Medin, 1981; Smith et 
al., 1988), which is one of the guidelines in 
current research on concept formation and artif- 
icial intelligence. 
Another limitation of our analysis, which it 
shares with the Fishbein paradigm, is the strictly 
elementaristic perspective. Attributes are treated 
as meaning elements in the formation of object 
meaning and, in the formation of an attitude 
toward the object, the evaluation of attributes 
appears as a major independent variable. How- 
ever, the evaluation of attributes may not be that 
invariant. As an example, the evaluation of 
((sweet)) may be different when associated with 
soft drinks than when associated with liquors (cf. 
Ahtola, 1975; Lutz & Bettman, 1977). As an- 
other example, the evaluation of ((sweet)) may be 
different when encountered in a ((refreshment)) 
context than when encountered in a ((cocktail)) 
context (cf. Ahtola, 1975; Lutz & Bettman, 
1977). Yet as another example, the evaluation of 
((sweet)) may be different when it co-occurs 
with ((carbonated)) than when it co-occurs with 
((uncarbonated)). Clearly, the dependency of 
attribute evaluation on the object in the effective 
context with which it is associated, on the gene- 
ral context in which it is encountered and on the 
attributes with which it tends to go together 
curtails the appropriateness of the elementaristic 
perspective adopted in multi-attribute research. 
While recognizing its inherent limitations, 
the framework presented here may improve the 
quality of multi-attribute modeling in marketing 
research. With regard to effective context, our 
approach may be relevant in that a brand is 
presumably not perceived and evaluated in isola- 
tion but with reference to its competitors in the 
product class. With regard to general context, 
our approach may be relevant in that a brand is 
often presented in the context of some persua- 
sive communication with a selling proposition 
(i.e., advertising or other promotional activities). 
For marketing researchers, the contrast model 
may be a helpful tool in pretesting various 
communications against one another with regard 
to the perception and evaluation of the target 
brand that is provoked. 
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ABSTRACT 
Fishbein’s (1967b) multi-attribute model of atti- 
tudes is a popular tool for the assessment of consumer 
perceptions and preferences in marketing research. 
This paper focuses on Fishbein’s learning theory of 
attitudes, the multi-attribute model that he has offered 
as a formalization of his theory and on the relationship 
between both. Problems that arise at the intersection of 
theory and model are discussed. Fishbein’s view on 
attribute ((salience)) is identified as a major determ- 
inant of these problems. Furthermore, the failure to 
recognize dependency of attribute salience on the 
context in which choice alternatives are perceived is 
argued to be a major limitation of  the Fishbein 
paradigm. The original theory is extended and the 
extended theory is formalized with an adaptation of 
Tversky’s (1977) contrast model of similarity. The 
strengths and weaknesses of the resulting framework 
for the marketing-research practice are briefly dis- 
cussed. 
RESUMO 
0 modelo dc multi-atributos dc atitudes de Fishbein 
(1 967b) 6 uma ferramenta comum para aceder as per- 
cepqBes e prefercncias do consumidor em estudos de 
mercado. Este artigo centra-se na teoria da aprendi- 
zagem de atitudes de Fishbein, o modelo de multi-atri- 
butos que ele ofcrcceu como uma formalizaqilo da sua 
teoria e na relaq2o entre eles. S2o discutidos OS proble- 
mas que surgem na interseq8o da teoria e o modelo. A 
perspectiva de  Fishbein sobre a ((salitnciai) dos 
atributos C identificada como a maior determinante 
destcs problemas. Em seguida, e argumcntado que a 
maior limitaqgo do paradigma dc Fishbein se deve a 
sua falha em reconhecer a dependcncia da salitncia 
dos atributos do context0 em que as alternativas de 
escolha s20 percebidas. A teoria original C alargada e 
esta C formalizada corn uma adaptaqlo do modelo de 
contrastes de similaridade de Tversky (1977). S l o  
resumidamentc discutidos O S  pontos fortes e fracos do 
enquadramento resultante para a pritica dc estudos de 
mercado. 
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